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Abstract
We examine the relationship between Dependence Logic and game
logics. A variant of Dynamic Game Logic, called Transition Logic, is
developed, and we show that its relationship with Dependence Logic is
comparable to the one between First-Order Logic and Dynamic Game
Logic discussed by van Benthem.
This suggests a new perspective on the interpretation of Dependence
Logic formulas, in terms of assertions about reachability in games of im-
perfect information against Nature. We then capitalize on this intuition by
developing expressively equivalent variants of Dependence Logic in which
this interpretation is taken to the foreground.
1 Introduction
1.1 Dependence Logic
Dependence Logic [17] is an extension of First-Order Logic which adds depen-
dence atoms of the form =(t1, . . . , tn) to it, with the intended interpretation of
“the value of the term tn is a function of the values of the terms t1 . . . tn−1.”
The introduction of such atoms is roughly equivalent to the introduction
of non-linear patterns of dependence and independence between variables of
Branching Quantifier Logic [7] or Independence Friendly Logic [10, 9, 15]: for
example, both the Branching Quantifier Logic sentence(
∀x ∃y
∀z ∃w
)
R(x, y, z, w)
and the Independence Friendly Logic sentence
∀x∃y∀z(∃w/x, y)R(x, y, z, w)
correspond in Dependence Logic to
∀x∃y∀z∃w(=(z, w) ∧R(x, y, z, w)),
1
in the sense that all of these expressions are equivalent to the Skolem formula
∃f∃g∀x∀zR(x, f(x), z, g(z)).
As this example illustrates, the main peculiarity of Dependence Logic compared
to the others above-mentioned logics lies in the fact that, in Dependence Logic,
the notion of dependence and independence between variables is explicitly sep-
arated from the notion of quantification. This makes it an eminently suitable
formalism for the formal analysis of the properties of dependence itself in a first-
order setting, and some recent papers ([5, 2, 4]) explore the effects of replace
dependence atoms with other similar primitives such as independence atoms [5],
multivalued dependence atoms [2], or inclusion or exclusion atoms [3, 4].
Branching Quantifier Logic, Independence Friendly Logic and Dependence
Logic, as well as their variants, are called logics of imperfect information: in-
deed, the truth conditions of their sentences can be obtained by defining, for ev-
ery model M and sentence φ, an imperfect-information semantic game GM (φ)
between a Verifier (also called Eloise) and a Falsifier (also called Abelard),
and then asserting that φ is true in M if and only if the Verifier has a win-
ning strategy in GM (φ). As an alternative of this (non-compositional) Game-
Theoretic Semantics, which is an imperfect-information variant of Hintikka’s
Game-Theoretic Semantics for First Order Logic [8], Hodges introduced in [11]
Team Semantics (also called Trump Semantics), a compositional semantics for
logics of imperfect information which is equivalent to Game-Theoretic Seman-
tics over sentences and in which formulas are satisfied or not satisfied not by
single assignments, but by sets of assignments (called Teams).
In this work, we will be mostly concerned with Team Semantics and some
of its variants. We refer the reader to the relevant literature (for example to
[17] and [15]) for further information regarding these logics: in the rest of this
section, we will content ourselves with recalling the definitions and results which
will be useful for the rest of this work.
Definition 1.1 (Assignments and substitutions) Let M be a first order
model and let V be a finite set of variables. Then an assignment over M with
domain V is a function s from V to the set Dom(M) of all elements of M .
Furthermore, for any assignment s over M with domain V , any element
m ∈ Dom(M) and any variable v (not necessarily in V ), we write s[m/v] for the
assignment with domain V ∪ {v} such that
s[m/v](w) =
{
m if w = v;
s(w) if w ∈ V \{v}
for all w ∈ V ∪ {v}.
Definition 1.2 (Team) Let M be a first-order model and let V be a finite set
of variables. A team X overM with domain Dom(X) = V is a set of assignments
from V to M .
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Definition 1.3 (Relations corresponding to teams) Let X be a team over
M , and let V be a finite set of variables. and let ~v be a finite tuple of variables
in its domain. Then X(~v) is the relation {s(~v) : s ∈ X}. Furthermore, we write
Rel(X) for X(Dom(X)).
As is often the case for Dependence Logic, we will assume that all our formulas
are in Negation Normal Form:
Definition 1.4 (Dependence Logic, Syntax) Let Σ be a first-order signa-
ture. Then the set of all dependence logic formula with signature Σ is given
by
φ ::= R~t | ¬R~t | =(t1, . . . , tn) | φ ∨ φ | φ ∧ φ | ∃vφ | ∀vφ
where R ranges over all relation symbols, ~t ranges over all tuples of terms of the
appropriate arities, t1 . . . tn range over all terms and v ranges over the set Var
of all variables.
The set Free(φ) of all free variables of a formula φ is defined precisely as in
First Order Logic, with the additional condition that all variables occurring in
a dependence atom are free with respect to it.
Definition 1.5 (Dependence Logic, Semantics) LetM be a first-order model,
let X be a team over it, and let φ be a Dependence Logic formula with the same
signature of M and with free variables in Dom(X). Then we say that X satisfies
φ in M , and we write M |=X φ, if and only if
TS-lit: φ is a first-order literal and M |=s φ for all s ∈ X;
TS-dep: φ is a dependence atom =(t1, . . . , tn) and any two assignments s, s
′ ∈
X which assign the same values to t1 . . . tn−1 also assign the same value
to tn;
TS-∨: φ is of the form ψ1 ∨ψ2 and there exist two teams Y1 and Y2 such that
X = Y1 ∪ Y2, M |=Y1 ψ1 and M |=Y2 ψ2;
TS-∧: φ is of the form ψ1 ∧ ψ2, M |=X ψ1 and M |=X ψ2;
TS-∃: φ is of the form ∃vψ and there exists a function F : X → Dom(M) such
that M |=X[F/v] ψ, where
X [F/v] = {s[F (s)/v] : s ∈ X}
TS-∀: φ is of the form ∀vψ and M |=X[M/v] ψ, where
X [M/v] = {s[m/v] : s ∈ X,m ∈ Dom(M)}.
The disjunction of Dependence Logic does not behave like the classical disjunc-
tion: for example, it is easy to see that =(x)∨ =(x) is not equivalent to =(x), as
the former holds for the team X = {{(x, 0)}, {(x, 1)}} and the latter does not.
However, it is possible to define the classical disjunction in terms of the other
connectives:
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Definition 1.6 (Classical Disjunction) Let ψ1 and ψ2 be two Dependence
Logic formulas, and let u1 and u2 be two variables not occurring in them. Then
we write ψ1 ⊔ ψ2 as a shorthand for
∃u1∃u2(=(u1)∧ =(u2) ∧ ((u1 = u2 ∧ ψ1) ∨ (u1 6= u2 ∧ ψ2))).
Proposition 1.1 For all formulas ψ1 and ψ2, all models M with at least two
elements1 whose signature contains that of ψ1 and ψ2 and all teams X whose
domain contains the free variables of ψ1 and ψ2
M |=X ψ1 ⊔ ψ2 ⇔M |=X ψ1 or M |=X ψ2.
The following four proportions are from [17]:
Proposition 1.2 For all models M and Dependence Logic formulas φ, M |=∅
φ.
Proposition 1.3 (Downwards Closure) IfM |=X φ and Y ⊆ X thenM |=Y
ψ.
Proposition 1.4 (Locality) If M |=X φ and X(Free(φ)) = Y (Free(φ)) then
M |=Y φ.
Proposition 1.5 (From Dependence Logic to Σ11) Let φ(~v) be a Dependence
Logic formula with free variables in ~v. Then there exists a Σ11 sentence Φ(R)
such that
M |=X φ⇔M |= Φ(X(~v))
for all suitable models M and for all nonempty teams X. Furthermore, in Φ(R)
the symbol R occurs only negatively.
As proved in [13], there is also a converse for the last proposition:
Theorem 1.7 (From Σ11 to Dependence Logic) Let Φ(R) be a Σ
1
1 sentence
in which R occurs only negatively. Then there exists a Dependence Logic formula
φ(~v), where |~v| is the arity of R, such that
M |=X φ⇔M |= Φ(X(~v))
for all suitable models M and for all nonempty teams X whose domain contains
~v.
Because of this correspondence between Dependence Logic and Existential Sec-
ond Order Logic, it is easy to see that Dependence Logic is closed under existen-
tial quantification: for all Dependence Logic formulas φ(~v, P ) over the signature
1In general, we will assume through this whole work that all first-order models which we
are considering have at least two elements. As one-element models are trivial, this is not a
very onerous restriction.
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Σ∪ {P} there exists a Dependence Logic formula ∃Pφ(~v, P ) over the signature
Σ such that
M |=X ∃Pφ(~v, P )⇔ ∃P s.t. M |=X φ(~v, P )
for all models M with domain Σ and for all teams X over the free variables
of φ. Therefore, in the rest of this work we will add second-order existential
quantifiers to the language of Dependence Logic, and we will write ∃Pφ(~v, P )
as a shorthand for the corresponding Dependence Logic expression.
1.2 Dynamic Game Logic
Game logics are logical formalisms for reasoning about games and their proper-
ties in a very general setting. Whereas the Game Theoretic Semantics approach
attempts to use game-theoretic techniques to interpret logical systems, game
logics attempt to put logic to the service of game theory, by providing a high-
level language for the study of games.
They generally contain two different kinds of expressions:
1. Game terms, which are descriptions of games in terms of compositions of
certain primitive atomic games, whose interpretation is presumed fixed for
any given game model;
2. Formulas, which, in general, correspond to assertions about the abilities
of players in games.
In this subsection, we are going to summarize the definition of a variant
of Dynamic Game Logic [16].2 Then, in the next subsection, we will discuss
a remarkable connection between First-Order Logic and Dynamic Game Logic
discovered by Johan van Benthem in [19].
One of the fundamental semantic concepts of Dynamic Game Logic is the
notion of forcing relation:
Definition 1.8 (Forcing Relation) Let S be a nonempty set of states. A
forcing relation over S is a set ρ ⊆ S×Parts(S), where Parts(S) is the powerset
of S.
In brief, a forcing relation specifies the abilities of a player in a perfect-information
game: (s,X) ∈ ρ if and only if the player has a strategy that guarantees that,
whenever the initial position of the game is s, the terminal position of the game
will be in X .
A (two-player) game is then defined as a pair of forcing relations satisfying
some axioms:
Definition 1.9 (Game) Let S be a nonempty set of states. A game over S is
a pair (ρE , ρA) of forcing relations over S satisfying the following conditions for
all i ∈ {E,A}, all s ∈ S and all X,Y ⊆ S:
2The main difference between this version and the one of Parikh’s original paper lies in the
absence of the iteration operator γ∗ from our formalism. In this, we follow [19, 20].
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Monotonicity: If (s,X) ∈ ρi and X ⊆ Y then (s, Y ) ∈ ρi;
Consistency: If (s,X) ∈ ρE and (s, Y ) ∈ ρA then X ∩ Y 6= ∅;
Non-triviality: (s, ∅) 6∈ ρi.
Determinacy: If (s,X) 6∈ ρi then (s, S\X) ∈ ρj, where j ∈ {E,A}\{i}.3
Definition 1.10 (Game Model) Let S be a nonempty set of states, let Φ be
a nonempty set of atomic propositions and let Γ be a nonempty set of atomic
game symbols. Then a game model over S, Φ and Γ is a triple (S, {(ρEg , ρ
A
g ) :
g ∈ Γ}, V ), where (ρEg , ρ
A
g ) is a game over S for all g ∈ Γ and where V is a
valutation function associating each p ∈ Φ to a subset V (p) ⊆ S.
The language of Dynamic Game Logic, as we already mentioned, consists of
game terms, built up from atomic games, and of formulas, built up from atomic
proposition. The connection between these two parts of the language is given
by the test operation φ?, which turns any formula φ into a test game, and the
diamond operation, which combines a game term γ and a formula φ into a new
formula 〈γ, i〉φ which asserts that agent i can guarantee that the game γ will
end in a state satisfying φ.
Definition 1.11 (Dynamic Game Logic - Syntax) Let Φ be a nonempty
set of atomic propositions and let Γ be a nonempty set of atomic game for-
mulas. Then the sets of all game terms γ and formulas φ are defined as
γ ::= g | φ? | γ; γ | γ ∪ γ | γd
φ ::= ⊥ | p | ¬φ | φ ∨ φ | 〈γ, i〉φ
for p ranging over Φ, g ranging over Γ, and i ranging over {E,A}.
We already mentioned the intended interpretations of the test connective φ?
and of the diamond connective 〈γ, i〉φ. The interpretations of the other game
connectives should be clear: γd is obtained by swapping the roles of the players
in γ, γ1∪γ2 is a game in which the existential player E chooses whether to play
γ1 or γ2, and γ1; γ2 is the concatenation of the two games corresponding to γ1
and γ2 respectively.
Definition 1.12 (Dynamic Game Logic - Semantics) Let G = (S, {(ρEg , ρ
A
g ) :
g ∈ Γ}, V ) be a game model over S, Γ and Φ. Then for all game terms γ and
all formulas φ of Dynamic Game Logic over Γ and Φ we define a game ‖γ‖G
and a set ‖φ‖G ⊆ S as follows:
DGL-atomic-game: For all g ∈ Γ, ‖g‖G = (ρEg , ρ
A
g );
DGL-test: For all formulas φ, ‖φ?‖G = (ρE , ρA), where
3This requirement is nothing but a formal version of Zermelo’s Theorem: if one of the
players cannot force the outcome of the game to belong to a set of “winning outcomes” X,
this implies that the other player can force it to belong to the complement of X.
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• sρEX iff s ∈ ‖φ‖G and s ∈ X;
• sρAX iff s 6∈ ‖φ‖G or s ∈ X
for all s ∈ S and all X with ∅ 6= X ⊆ S;
DGL-concat: For all game terms γ1 and γ2, ‖γ1; γ2‖G = (ρ
E , ρA), where,
for all i ∈ {E,A} and for ‖γ1‖G = (ρE1 , ρ
A
1 ), ‖γ2‖G = (ρ
E
2 , ρ
A
2 ),
• sρiX if and only if there exists a Z such that sρi1Z and for each
z ∈ Z there exists a set Xz satisfying zρi2Xz such that
X =
⋃
z∈Z
Xz;
DGL-∪: For all game terms γ1 and γ2, ‖γ1 ∪ γ2‖G = (ρE , ρA), where
• sρEX if and only if sρE1 X or sρ
E
2 X, and
• sρAX if and only if sρA1 X and sρ
A
2 X
where, as before, ‖γ1‖G = (ρ
E
1 , ρ
A
1 ) and ‖γ2‖G = (ρ
E
2 , ρ
A
2 );
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DGL-dual: If ‖γ‖G = (ρE , ρA) then ‖γd‖G = (ρA, ρE);
DGL-⊥: ‖⊥‖G = ∅;
DGL-atomic-pr: ‖p‖G = V (p);
DGL-¬: ‖¬φ‖G = S\‖φ‖G;
DGL-∨: ‖φ1 ∨ φ2‖G = ‖φ1‖G ∪ ‖φ2‖G;
DGL-⋄: If ‖γ‖G = (ρE , ρA) then for all φ,
‖〈γ, i〉φ‖G = {s ∈ S : ∃Xs ⊆ ‖φ‖G s.t. sρ
iXs}.
If s ∈ ‖φ‖G, we say that φ is satisfied by s in G and we write M |=s φ.
We will not discuss here the properties of this logic, or the vast amount of
variants and extensions of it which have been developed and studied. It is worth
pointing out, however, that [20] introduced a Concurrent Dynamic Game Logic
that can be considered one of the main sources of inspiration for the Transition
Logic that we will develop in Subsection 3.2.
4[20] gives the following alternative condition for the powers of the universal player:
• sρAX if and only if X = Z1 ∪ Z2 for two Z1 and Z2 such that sρA1 Z1 and sρ
A
2
Z2.
It is trivial to see that, if our games satisfy the monotonicity condition, this rules is equivalent
to the one we presented.
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1.3 Dynamic Game Logic and First Order Logic
In this subsection, we will briefly recall a remarkable result from [19] which
establishes a connection between Dynamic Game Logic and First-Order Logic.
In brief, as the following two theorems demonstrate, either of these logics
can be seen as a special case of the other, in the sense that models and formulas
of the one can be uniformly translated into models of the other in a way which
preserves satisfiability and truth:
Theorem 1.13 Let G = (S, {(ρEg , ρ
A
g ) : g ∈ Γ}, V ) be any game model, let φ be
any game formula for the same language, and let s ∈ S. Then it is possible to
uniformly construct a first-order model GFO, a first-order formula φFO and an
assignment sFO of GFO such that
G |=s φ⇔ G
FO |=sFO φ
FO.
Theorem 1.14 Let M be any first order model, let φ be any first-order formula
for the signature of M , and let s be an assignment of M . Then it is possible
to uniformly construct a game model GDGL, a game formula φDGL and a state
sDGL such that
M |=s φ⇔ G
DGL |=sDGL φ
DGL.
We will not discuss here the proofs of these two results. Their significance,
however, is something about which is necessary to spend a few words. In brief,
what this back-and-forth representation between First Order Logic and Dynamic
Game Logic tells us is that it is possible to understand First Order Logic as a
logic for reasoning about determined games !
In the next sections, we will attempt to develop a similar result for the case
of Dependence Logic.
2 Transition Logic
2.1 A Logic for Imperfect Information Games Against Na-
ture
We will now define a variant of Dynamic Game Logic, which we will call Tran-
sition Logic. It deviates from the basic framework of Dynamic Game Logic in
two fundamental ways:
1. It considers one-player games against Nature, instead of two-player games
as is usual in Dynamic Game Logic;
2. It allows for uncertainty about the initial position of the game.
Hence, Transition Logic can be seen as a decision-theoretic logic, rather than
a game-theoretic one: Transition Logic formulas, as we will see, correspond to
assertions about the abilities of a single agent acting under uncertainty, instead
of assertions about the abilities of agents interacting with each other.
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In principle, it is certainly possible to generalize the approach discussed here
to multiple agents acting in situations of imperfect information, and doing so
might cause interesting phenomena to surface; but for the time being, we will
content ourselves with developing this formalism and discussing its connection
with Dependence Logic.
Our first definition is a fairly straightforward generalization of the concept
of forcing relation:
Definition 2.1 (Transition system) Let S be a nonempty set of states. A
transition system over S is a nonempty relation θ ⊆ Parts(S) × Parts(S)
satisfying the following requirements:
Downwards Closure: If (X,Y ) ∈ θ and X ′ ⊆ X then (X ′, Y ) ∈ θ;
Monotonicity: If (X,Y ) ∈ θ and Y ⊆ Y ′ then (X,Y ′) ∈ θ;
Non-creation: (∅, Y ) ∈ θ for all Y ⊆ S;
Non-triviality: If X 6= ∅ then (X, ∅) 6∈ θ.
Informally speaking, a transition system specifies the abilities of an agent: for all
X,Y ⊆ S such that (X,Y ) ∈ θ, the agent has a strategy which guarantees that
the output of the transition will be in Y whenever the input of the transition is
in X .
The four axioms which we gave capture precisely this intended meaning, as
we will see:
Definition 2.2 (Decision Game) A decision game is a triple Γ = (S,E,O),
where S is a nonempty set of states, E is a nonempty set of possible decisions
for our agent and O is an outcome function from S × E to Parts(S).
If s′ ∈ O(s, e), we say that s′ is a possible outcome of s under e; if O(s, e) =
∅, we say that e fails on input s.
Definition 2.3 (Abilities in a decision game) Let Γ = (S,E,O) be a de-
cision game, and let X,Y ⊆ S. Then we say that Γ allows the transition
X → Y , and we write Γ : X → Y , if and only if there exists a e ∈ E such that
∅ 6= O(s, e) ⊆ Y for all s ∈ X (that is, if and only if our agent can make a
decision which guarantees that the outcome will be in Y whenever the input is
in X).
Theorem 2.4 (Transition Systems and Abilities) A set θ ⊆ Parts(S) ×
Parts(S) is a transition system if and only if there exists a decision game Γ =
(S,E,O) such that
(X,Y ) ∈ θ ⇔ Γ : X → Y.
Proof:
Let θ ⊆ Parts(S) × Parts(S) be any transition system, let us enumerate its
elements {(Xi, Yi) : i ∈ I)}, and let us consider the game Γ = (S, I, O), where
O(s, i) =
{
Yi if s ∈ Xi;
∅ otherwise.
9
Suppose that (X,Y ) ∈ θ. If X = ∅, then Γ : X → Y follows at once by
definition. If instead X 6= ∅, by non-triviality we have that Y is nonempty
too, and furthermore (X,Y ) = (Xi, Yi) for some i ∈ I. Then O(s, i) = Yi 6= ∅
for all s ∈ Xi, as required.
Now suppose that Γ : X → Y . Then there exists a i ∈ I such that ∅ 6=
O(s, i) ⊆ Y for all s ∈ X . If X 6= ∅, this implies that X ⊆ Xi and Yi ⊆ Y .
Hence, by monotonicity and downwards closure, (X,Y ) ∈ θ, as required.
If instead X = ∅, then by non-creation we have again that (X,Y ) ∈ θ.
Conversely, consider a decision game Γ = (S,E,O). Then the set of its
abilities satisfies our four axioms:
Downwards Closure: Suppose that Γ : X → Y and that X ′ ⊆ X . By
definition, there exists a e ∈ E such that ∅ 6= O(s, e) ⊆ Y for all s ∈ X .
But then the same holds for all s ∈ X ′, and hence Γ : X ′ → Y .
Monotonicity: Suppose that Γ : X → Y and that Y ⊆ Y ′. By definition,
there exists a e ∈ E such that ∅ 6= O(s, e) ⊆ Y for all s ∈ X . But then,
for all such s, O(s, e) ⊆ Y ′ too, and hence Γ : X → Y ′.
Non-creation: Let Y ⊆ S and let e ∈ E be any possible decision. Then
trivially ∅ 6= O(s, e) ⊆ Y for all s ∈ ∅, and hence Γ : ∅ → Y .
Non-triviality: Let s0 ∈ X , and suppose that Γ : X → Y . Then there exists
a e such that ∅ 6= O(s, e) ⊆ Y for all s ∈ X , and hence in particular
∅ 6= O(s0, e) ⊆ Y . Therefore, Y is nonempty.

What this theorem tells us is that our notion of transition system is the correct
one: it captures precisely the abilities of an agent making choices under imper-
fect information and attempting to guarantee that, if the initial state is in a set
X , the outcome will be in a set Y .
Definition 2.5 (Trump) Let S be a nonempty set of states. A trump over S
is a nonempty, downwards closed family of subsets of S.
Whereas a transition system describes the abilities of an agent to transition
from a set of possible initial states to a set of possible terminal states, a trump
describes the agent’s abilities to reach some terminal state from a set of possible
initial states:5
Proposition 2.1 Let θ be a transition system and let Y ⊆ S 6= ∅. Then
reach(θ, Y ) = {X | (X,Y ) ∈ θ} forms a trump. Conversely, for any trump
X over S there exists a transition system θ such that X = reach(θ, Y ) for any
nonempty Y ⊆ S.
5The term “trump” is taken from [11], where it is used to describe the set of all teams
which satisfy a given formula.
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Proof:
Let θ be a transition system. Then if (X,Y ) ∈ θ and X ′ ⊆ X , by downwards
closure we have at once that (X ′, Y ) ∈ θ. Furthermore, (∅, Y ) ∈ θ for any Y .
Hence, reach(θ, Y ) is a trump, as required.
Conversely, let X ⊆ Parts(Parts(S)) be a trump, and let us enumerate its
elements as {Xi : i ∈ I}. Then define θ as
θ = {(A,B) : ∅ 6= B ⊆ S, ∃i ∈ I s.t. A ⊆ Xi} ∪ {(∅, ∅)}
It is easy to see that θ is a transition system; and by construction, for Y 6= ∅ we
have that (A, Y ) ∈ θ ⇔ ∃i s.t. A ⊆ Xi ⇔ A ∈ X , where we used the fact that
X is downwards closed.

We can now define the syntax and semantics of Transition Logic:
Definition 2.6 (Transition Model) Let Φ be a set of atomic propositional
symbols and let Θ be a set of atomic transition symbols. Then a transition
model is a tuple T = (S, {θt : t ∈ Θ}, V ), where S is a nonempty set of states,
θt is a transition system over S for any t ∈ Θ, and V is a function sending each
p ∈ Φ into a trump of S.
Definition 2.7 (Transition Logic - Syntax) Let Φ be a set of atomic propo-
sitions and let Θ be a set of atomic transitions. Then the transition terms and
formulas of our language are defined respectively as
τ ::= t | φ? | τ ⊗ τ | τ ∩ τ | τ ; τ
φ ::= ⊤ | p | φ ∨ φ | φ ∧ φ | 〈τ〉φ
where t ranges over Θ and p ranges over Φ.
Definition 2.8 (Transition Logic - Semantics) Let T = (S, {θt : t ∈ Θ), V )
be a transition model, let τ be a transition term, and let X,Y ⊆ S. Then we
say that τ allows the transition from X to Y , and we write T |=X→Y τ , if and
only if
TL-atomic-tr: τ = t for some t ∈ Θ and (X,Y ) ∈ θt;
TL-test: τ = φ? for some transition formula φ such that T |=X φ in the sense
described later in this definition, and X ⊆ Y ;
TL-⊗: τ = τ1⊗τ2, and X = X1∪X2 for twoX1 and X2 such that T |=X1→Y τ1
and T |=X2→Y τ2;
TL-∩: τ = τ1 ∩ τ2, T |=X→Y τ1 and T |=X→Y τ2;
TL-concat: τ = τ1; τ2 and there exists a Z ⊆ S such that T |=X→Z τ1 and
T |=Z→Y τ2.
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Analogously, let φ be a transition formula, and let X ⊆ S. Then we say that X
satisfies φ, and we write T |=X φ, if and only if
TL-⊤: φ = ⊤;
TL-atomic-pr: φ = p for some p ∈ Φ and X ∈ V (p);
TL-∨: φ = ψ1 ∨ ψ2 and T |=X ψ1 or T |=X ψ2;
TL-∧: φ = ψ1 ∧ ψ2, T |=X ψ1 and T |=X ψ2;
TL-⋄: φ = 〈τ〉ψ and there exists a Y such that T |=X→Y τ and T |=Y ψ.
Proposition 2.2 For any transition model T , transition term τ and transition
formula φ, the set
‖τ‖T = {(X,Y ) : T |=X→Y τ}
is a transition system and the set
‖φ‖T = {X : T |=X φ}
is a trump.
Proof:
By induction.

We end this subsection with a few simple observations about this logic.
First of all, we did not take the negation as one of the primitive connectives.
Indeed, Transition Logic, much like Dependence Logic, has an intrinsically exis-
tential character: it can be used to reason about which sets of possible states an
agent may reach, but not to reason about which ones such an agent must reach.
There is of course no reason, in principle, why a negation could not be added
to the language, just as there is no reason why a negation cannot be added to
Dependence Logic, thus obtaining the far more powerful Team Logic [18, 12]:
however, this possible extension will not be studied in this work.
The connectives of Transition Logic are, for the most part, very similar to
those of Dynamic Game Logic, and their interpretation should pose no difficul-
ties. The exception is the tensor operator τ1 ⊗ τ2, which substitutes the game
union operator γ1 ∪ γ2 and which, while sharing roughly the same informal
meaning, behaves in a very different way from the semantic point of view (for
example, it is not in general idempotent!)
The decision game corresponding to τ1⊗ τ2 can be described as follows: first
the agent chooses an index i ∈ {1, 2}, then he or she picks a strategy for τi and
plays accordingly. However, the choice of i may be a function of the initial state:
hence, the agent can guarantee that the output state will be in Y whenever the
input state is in X only if he or she can split X into two subsets X1 and X2
and guarantee that the state in Y will be reached from any state in X1 when
τ1 is played, and from any state in X2 when τ2 is played.
It is also of course possible to introduce a “true” choice operator τ1 ∪ τ2,
with semantical condition
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TL-∪: T |=X→Y τ1 ∪ τ2 iff T |=X→Y τ1 or T |=X→Y τ2;
but we will not explore this possibility any further in this work, nor we will con-
sider any other possible connectives such as, for example, the iteration operator
TL-∗: T |=X→Y τ∗ iff there exist n ∈ N and Z0 . . . Zn such that Z0 = X ,
Zn = Y and T |=Zi→Zi+1 τ for all i ∈ 1 . . . n− 1.
2.2 Transition Logic and Dependence Logic
This subsection contains the central result of this work, that is, the analogues
of Theorems 1.13 and 1.14 for Dependence Logic and Transition Logic.
Representing Dependence Logic models and formulas in Transition Logic is
fairly simple:
Definition 2.9 (MTL) Let M be a first-order model. Then MTL is the tran-
sition model (S,Θ, V ) such that
• S is the set of all teams over M ;
• The set of all atomic transition symbols is {∃v, ∀v : v ∈ Var}, and hence
Θ is {θ∃v, θ∀v : v ∈ Var};
• For any variable v, θ∃v = {(X,Y ) : ∃F s.t. X [F/v] ⊆ Y } and θ∀v =
{(X,Y ) : X [M/v] ⊆ Y };
• For any first-order literal or dependence atom α, V (α) = {X :M |=X φ}.
Definition 2.10 (φTL) Let φ be a Dependence Logic formula. Then φTL is the
transition term defined as follows:
1. If φ is a literal or a dependence atom, φTL = φ?;
2. If φ = ψ1 ∨ ψ2, φ
TL = (ψ1)
TL ⊗ (ψ2)
TL;
3. If φ = ψ1 ∧ ψ2, φTL = (ψ1)TL ∧ (ψ2)TL;
4. If φ = ∃vψ, φTL = ∃v; (ψ)TL;
5. If φ = ∀vψ, φTL = ∀v; (ψ)TL.
Theorem 2.11 For all first-order models M , teams X and formulas φ, the
following are equivalent:
• M |=X φ;
• ∃Y s.t. MTL |=X→Y φTL;
• MTL |=X 〈φTL〉⊤;
• MTL |=X→S φTL.
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Proof:
We show, by structural induction on φ, that the first condition is equivalent to
the last one. The equivalences between the last one and the second and third
ones are then trivial.
1. If φ is a literal or a dependence atom, MTL |=X→S φ? if and only if
X ∈ V (φ), that is, if and only if M |=X φ;
2. MTL |=X→S (ψ1)TL⊗(ψ2)TL if and only if X = X1∪X2 for twoX1, X2 ⊆
S such thatMTL |=X1→S (ψ1)
TL andMTL |=X2→S (ψ2)
TL. By induction
hypothesis, this can be the case if and only if M |=X1 ψ1 and M |=X2 ψ2,
that is, if and only if M |=X ψ1 ∨ ψ2.
3. MTL |=X→S (ψ1)
TL ∧ (ψ2)
TL if and only if MTL |=X→S (ψ1)
TL and
MTL |=X→S (ψ2)TL, that is, by induction hypothesis, if and only ifM |=X
ψ1 ∧ ψ2.
4. MTL |=X→S ∃v; (ψ)TL if and only if there exists a Y such that Y ⊇
X [F/v] for some F and MTL |=Y→S ψ. By induction hypothesis and
downwards closure, this can be the case if and only if M |=X[F/v] ψ for
some F , that is, if and only if M |=X ∃vψ;
5. MTL |=X→S ∀v; (ψ)TL if and only if MTL |=Y→S (ψ)TL for some Y ⊇
X [M/v], that is, if and only if M |=X[M/v] ψ, that is, if and only if
M |=X ∀vψ.

One interesting aspect of this representation result is that Dependence Logic
formulas correspond to Transition Logic transitions, not to Transition Logic
formulas. This can be thought of as one first hint of the fact that Dependence
Logic can be thought of as a logic of transitions: and in the later sections, we
will explore this idea more in depth.
Representing Transition Models, game terms and formulas in Dependence
Logic is somewhat more complex:
Definition 2.12 (TDL) Let T = (S, (θt : t ∈ Θ), V ) be a transition model.
Furthermore, for any t ∈ Θ, let θt = {(Xi, Yi) : i ∈ It}, and, for any p ∈ Φ,
let V (p) = {Xj : j ∈ Jp}. Then TDL is the first-order model with domain6
S ⊎
⊎
{It : t ∈ Θ} ⊎
⊎
{Jp : p ∈ Φ} whose signature contains
• For every t ∈ Θ, a ternary relation Rt whose interpretation is {(i, x, y) :
i ∈ It, x ∈ Xi, y ∈ Yi};
• For every p ∈ Φ, a binary relation Vp whose interpretation is {(j, x) : j ∈
Jp, x ∈ Xj}.
6Here we write A ⊎ B for the disjoint union of the sets A and B.
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Definition 2.13 (φDLx and τ
DL
x ) For any transition formula φ and variable
x, the Dependence Logic formula φDLx is defined as
1. ⊤DLx is ⊤;
2. For all p ∈ Φ, pDLx is ∃j(=(j) ∧ Vp(j, x));
3. (ψ1 ∨ ψ2)DLx is (ψ1)
DL
x ⊔ (ψ2)
DL, where ⊔ is the classical disjunction in-
troduced in Definition 1.6;
4. (ψ1 ∧ ψ2)DLx is (ψ1)
DL
x ∧ (ψ2)
DL
x ;
5. (〈τ〉ψ)DLx is ∃P ((τ)
DL
x (P ) ∧ ∀y(¬Py ∨ (ψ)
DL
y )),
where for any transition term τ , variable x and unary relation symbol P , τDLx (P )
is defined as
6. For all t ∈ Θ, tDLx (P ) is ∃i(=(i)∧ ∃y(Rt(i, x, y))∧ ∀y(¬Rt(i, x, y)∨Py));
7. For all formulas φ, (φ?)DLx (P ) is φ
DL
x ∧ Px;
8. (τ1 ⊗ τ2)DLx (P ) = (τ1)
DL
x (P ) ∨ (τ2)
DL
x (P );
9. (τ1 ∩ τ2)DLx (P ) = (τ1)
DL
x (P ) ∧ (τ2)
DL
x (P );
10. (τ1; τ2)
DL
x (P ) = ∃Q((τ1)
DL
x (Q) ∧ ∀y(¬Qy ∨ (τ2)
DL
y (P ))) for a new and
unused variable y.
Theorem 2.14 For all transition models T = (S, (θt : t ∈ Θ), V ), transition
terms τ , transition formulas φ, variables x, sets P ⊆ S and teams X over TDL
with X(x) ⊆ S,7
TDL |=X φ
DL
x ⇔ T |=X(x) φ
and
TDL |=X τ
DL
x (P )⇔ T |=X(x)→P τ.
Proof:
The proof is by structural induction on terms and formulas.
Let us first consider the cases corresponding to formulas:
1. For all teams X , TDL |=X ⊤ and T |=X(x) ⊤, as required;
2. Suppose that TDL |=X ∃j(= (j) ∧ Vp(j, x)). Then there exists a m ∈
Dom(TDL) such that TDL |=X[m/j] Vp(j, x). Hence, we have that X(x) ⊆
Xm ∈ V (p); and, by downwards closure, this implies that X(x) ∈ V (p),
and hence that T |=X(x) p as required.
Conversely, suppose that T |=X(x) p. Then X(x) ∈ V (p), and hence
X(x) = Xm for somem ∈ Jp. Then we have by definition that TDL |=X[m/j]
Vp(j, x), and finally that T
DL |=X Tx(p).
7That is, such that X(x) is a set of states of the transition model.
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3. By Proposition 1.1, TDL |=X (ψ1 ∨ ψ2)DLx if and only if T
DL |=X (ψ1)DLx
or TDL |=X (ψ2)DLx . By induction hypothesis, this is the case if and only
if T |=X(x) ψ1 or T |=X(x) ψ2, that is, if and only if T |=X(x) ψ1 ∨ ψ2.
4. TDL |=X (ψ1∧ψ2)DLx if and only if T
DL |=X (ψ1)DLx and T
DL |=x (ψ2)DLx ,
that is, by induction hypothesis, if and only if T |=X ψ1 ∧ ψ2.
5. TDL |=X (〈τ〉ψ)DLx if and only if there exists a P such that T
DL |=X
(τ)DLx (P ) and T
DL |=X[TDL/y] ¬Py ∨ (ψ)
DL
y . By induction hypothesis,
the first condition holds if and only if T |=X(x)→P τ . As for the second
one, it holds if and only if X [TDL/y] = Y1 ∪ Y2 for two Y1, Y2 such
that TDL |=Y1 ¬Py and T
DL |=Y2 τy(ψ). But then we must have that
T |=Y2(y) ψ and that P ⊆ Y2(y); therefore, by downwards closure, T |=P ψ
and finally T |=X(x) 〈τ〉ψ.
Conversely, suppose that there exists a P such that T |=X(x)→P τ and
T |=P ψ; then by induction hypothesis we have that TDL |=X (τ)DLx (P )
and that TDL |=X[TDL/y] ¬Py ∨ (ψ)
DL
x , and hence T
DL |=X (〈τ〉ψ)DLx .
Now let us consider the cases corresponding to transition terms:
6. Suppose that TDL |=X ∃i(=(i) ∧ ∃y(Rt(i, x, y)) ∧ ∀y(¬Rt(i, x, y) ∨ Py)).
If X = ∅ then X(x) = ∅, and hence by non-creation we have that
(X(x), P ) = (∅, P ) ∈ θt, as required.
Let us assume instead that X 6= ∅. Then, by hypothesis, there exists a
m ∈ Dom(TDL) such that
• There exists a F such that TDL |=X[m/i][F/y] Rt(i, x, y);
• TDL |=X[m/i][TDL/y] ¬Rt(i, x, y) ∨ Py.
From the first condition it follows that for every p ∈ X(x) there exists a q
such that Rt(m, p, q): therefore, by the definition of Rt, every such p must
be in Xm.
From the second condition it follows that whenever Rt(m, p, q) and p ∈
X(x) ⊆ Xm, q ∈ P ; and, since X(x) 6= ∅, this implies that Ym ⊆ P by the
definition of Rt.
Hence, bymonotonicity and downwards closure, we have that (X(x), P ) ∈
θt and that T |=X(x)→P t, as required.
Conversely, suppose that (X(x), P ) = (Xm, Ym) ∈ θt for some m ∈ It. If
X(x) = ∅ thenX = ∅, and hence by Proposition 1.2 we have that TDL |=X
tDLx (P ), as required. Otherwise, by non-triviality, P = Ym 6= ∅. Let now
p ∈ P be any of its elements and let F (s) = p for all p ∈ X [m/i]: then
M |=X[m/i][F/y] Rt(i, x, y), as any assignment of this team sends x to
some element of Xm and y to p ∈ Ym. Furthermore, let s ∈ X(x) = Xm,
and let q be such that Rt(m, s(x), q): then q ∈ Ym = P , and hence
M |=X[m/i][TDL/y] ¬Rt(i, x, y) ∨ Py. So, in conclusion, M |=X t
DL
x (P ), as
required.
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7. TDL |=X φDLx ∧ Px if and only if T |=X(x) φ and X(x) ⊆ P , that is, if
and only if T |=X(x)→P φ?.
8. TDL |=X (τ1)DLx (P )∨(τ2)
DL
x (P ) if and only if X = X1∪X2 for twoX1, X2
such that
• X = X1 ∪X2, and therefore X(x) = X1(x) ∪X2(x);
• TDL |=X1 (τ1)
DL
x (P ), that is, by induction hypothesis, T |=X1(x)→P
τ1;
• TDL |=X2 (τ2)
DL
x (P ), that is, by induction hypothesis, T |=X2(x)→P
τ2;
Hence, if TDL |=X (τ1 ⊗ τ2)DLx (P ) then T |=X(x)→P τ1 ⊗ τ2.
Conversely, if X(x) = A ∪ B for two A, B such that T |=A→P τ1 and
T |=B→P τ2, let
X1 = {s ∈ X : s(x) ∈ A}
X2 = {s ∈ X : s(x) ∈ B}.
Clearly X = X1∪X2, and furthermore by induction hypothesis TDL |=X1
(τ1)
DL
x (P ) and T
DL |=X2 (τ2)
DL
x (P ). Hence, T
DL |=X (τ1 ⊗ τ2)DLx (P ), as
required.
9. TDL |=X (τ1 ∩ τ2)DLx (P ) if and only if T
DL |=X (τ1)DLx (P ) and T
DL |=X
(τ2)
DL
x (P ), that is, by induction hypothesis, if and only if T |=X(x)→P
τ1 ∩ τ2.
10. TDL |=X ∃Q((τ1)DLx (Q)∧∀y(¬Qy∨(τ2)
DL
y (P ))) if and only if there exists a
Q such that T |=X(x)→Q τ1 and there exists a Q
′ ⊇ Q such that T |=Q′→P
τ2. By downwards closure, if this is the case then T |=Q→P τ2 too, and
hence T |=X(x)→P τ1; τ2, as required.
Conversely, suppose that there exists a Q such that T |=X(x)→Q τ1 and
T |=Q→P τ2. Then, by induction hypothesis T
DL |=X (τ1)
DL
x (Q); and
furthermore, X [TDL/y] can be split into
Z1 = {s ∈ X [T
DL/y] : s(y) 6∈ Q}
and
Z2 = {s ∈ X [T
DL/y] : s(y) ∈ Q}
It is trivial to see that TDL |=Z1 ¬Qy; and furthermore, since Z2(y) =
Q and T |=Q→P τ2, by induction hypothesis we have that TDL |=Z2
(τ2)
DL
y . Thus T
DL |=X[TDL/y] ∀y(¬Qy ∨ (τ2)
DL
y (P )) and finally T
DL |=X
(τ1; τ2)
DL
x (P ), and this concludes the proof.

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Hence, the relationship between Transition Logic and Dependence Logic is anal-
ogous to the one between Dynamic Game Logic and First-Order Logic. In the
next sections, we will develop variants of Dependence Logic which are syntacti-
cally closer to Transition Logic, while still being first-order: as we will see, the
resulting frameworks are expressively equivalent to Dependence Logic on the
level of satisfiability, but can be used to represent finer-grained phenomena of
transitions between sets of assignments.
3 Dynamic Variants of Dependence Logic
3.1 Dependence Logic and Transitions between Teams
Now that we have established a connection between Dependence Logic and a
variant of Dynamic Game Logic, it is time to explore what this might imply
for the further development of logics of imperfect information. If, as Theo-
rems 2.11 and 2.14 suggest, Dependence Logic can be thought of as a logic of
imperfect-information decision problems, perhaps it could be possible to develop
variants of Dependence Logic in which expressions can be interpreted directly
as transition systems?
In what follows, we will do exactly that, first with Transition Dependence
Logic – a variant of Dependence Logic, expressively equivalent to it, which is also
a quantified version of Transition Logic – and then with Dynamic Dependence
Logic, in which all expressions are interpreted as transitions!
But why would we interested in such variants of Dependence Logic? One pos-
sible answer, which we will discuss in this subsection, is that transitions between
teams are already a central object of study in the field of Dependence Logic,
albeit in a non-explicit manner: after all, the semantics of Dependence Logic
interprets quantifiers in terms of transformations of teams, and disjunctions in
terms of decompositions of teams into subteams. This intuition is central to the
study of issues of interdefinability in Dependence Logic and its variants, like for
example the ones discussed in [4]. As a simple example, let us recall Definition
1.6:
ψ1 ⊔ ψ2 := ∃u1∃u2(=(u1)∧ =(u2) ∧ ((u1 = u2 ∧ ψ1) ∨ (u1 6= u2 ∧ ψ2))),
where u1 and u2 are new variables.
As we said in Proposition 1.1, M |=X ψ1 ⊔ ψ2 if and only if M |=X ψ1 or
M |=X ψ2. We will now sketch the proof of this result, and – as we will see
– this proof will hinge on the fact that the above expression can be read as a
specification of the following algorithm:
1. Choose an element a ∈ Dom(M) and extend the team X by assigning a as
the value of u1 for all assignments;
2. Choose an element b ∈ Dom(M) and further extend the team by assigning
b as the value of u2 for all assignments;
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3. Split the resulting team into two subteams Y1 and Y2 such that
(a) ψ1 holds in Y1, and the values of u1 and u2 coincide for all assignments
in it;
(b) ψ2 holds in Y2, and the values of u1 and u2 differ for all assignments
in it.
Since the values of u1 and u2 are chosen to always be respectively a and b, one
of Y1 and Y2 is empty and the other is of the form X [ab/u1u2], and since u1 and
u2 do not occur in ψ1 or ψ2 the above algorithm can succeed (for some choice
of a and b) only if M |=X ψ1 or M |=X ψ2.
As another, slightly more complicated example, let us consider the following
problem. Given four variables x1, x2, y1 and y2, let x1x2 | y1y2 be an exclusion
atom holding in a team X if and only if for all s, s′ ∈ X , s(x1x2) 6= s′(y1y2) –
that is, if and only if the sets of the values taken by x1x2 and by y1y2 in X are
disjoint.
By Theorem 1.7, we can tell at once that there exists some Dependence
Logic formula φ(x1, x2, y1, y2) such that for all suitable M and X , M |=X
φ(x1, x2, y1, y2) if and only if M |=X x1x2 | y1y2; but what about the converse?
For example, can we find an expression ψ(x, y), in the language of First Order
Logic augmented with these exclusion atoms (but with no dependence atoms),
such that for all suitable M and X M |=X ψ(x, y) if and only if M |=X=(x, y)?
As discussed in [4] in a more general setting, the answer is positive, and one
such ψ(x, y) is ∀z(z = y ∨ (z 6= y ∧ xz | xy)), where z is some variable other
than x and y.8 Why is this the case?
Well, let us consider any team X with domain containing x and y, and let
us evaluate ψ(x, y) over it. As shown graphically in Figure 1, the transitions
between teams occurring during the evaluation of the formula correspond to the
following algorithm:
1. First, assign all possible values to the variable z for all assignments in x,
thus obtaining X [M/z] = {s[m/z] : s ∈ X,m ∈ Dom(M)};
2. Then, remove from X [M/z] all assignments s for which s(z) = s(x), keep-
ing only the ones for which s(z) 6= s(y);
3. Then, verify that for any possible fixed value of x, the possible values of
y and z are disjoint.
This algorithm succeeds only if y is a function of x. Indeed, suppose that
instead there are two assignments s, s′ ∈ X such that s(x) = s′(x) = a, s(y) =
b and s′(y) = c for three a, b, c ∈ Dom(M) with b 6= c. Now we have that
{s[b/z], s[c/z], s′[b/z], s′[c/z]} ⊆ X [M/z]: and since b 6= c, we have that the
assignments s[c/z] and s′[b/z] are not removed from the team in the second
step of the proof. But then s[c/z](xz) = ac = s′[b/z](xy), and therefore it
8A moment’s thought shows that, by downwards closure, the condition z 6= y in the second
disjunct can be removed, but for simplicity we will keep it.
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is not true that xy | xz. And, conversely, if in the team X the value of y is
a function of the value of x then by splitting X [M/z] into the two subteams
Y = {s[m/z] : s ∈ X, s(y) = s(z)} and Z = {s[m/z] : s(y) 6= s(z)} we have
that M |=Y y = z, M |=Z y 6= z and M |=Z xz | xy (since for all s, s′ ∈ Z,
s(x) = s′(x)⇒ s(y) = s′(y)⇒ s(z) 6= s(y) = s′(z)).
On the other hand, one Dependence Logic expression corresponding to x1x2 | y1y2
is
∀w1w2∃u1u2(=(w1, w2, u1)∧ =(w1, w2, u2)∧
((u1 = u2 ∧ (w1 6= x1 ∨w2 6= z2))∨
(u1 6= u2 ∧ (w1 6= y1 ∨ w2 6= y2))))
where w1, w2, u1 and u2 are new variable.
We encourage the interested reader to verify that this is the case by exam-
ining the transitions between teams corresponding to the formula: in brief, the
intuition is that first we extend our team by picking all possible pairs of values
for w1 and w2, then for any such pair we flag – through our choice of u1 and u2
– whether w1w2 is different from x1x2 or from y1y2. This implies that no such
pair is equal to both x1x2 and y1y2, or, in other words, that x1x2 and y1y2 have
no value in common.
More and more complex examples of definability results of this kind can be
found in [4]; but what we want to emphasize here is that all these examples, like
the one we discussed in depth here, have a natural interpretation in terms of
algorithms which transform teams and apply simple tests to them, as the above
one. Hence, we hope that the development of variants of Dependence Logic in
which these transitions are made explicit might prove itself useful for the further
study of this interesting class of problems.
3.2 Transition Dependence Logic
As stated, we will now define a variant of Dependence Logic which can also be
seen as a quantified variant of Transition Logic. We will then prove that the
resulting Transition Dependence Logic is expressively equivalent to Dependence
Logic, in the sense that any Dependence Logic formula is equivalent to some
Transition Dependence Logic formula and vice versa.
Definition 3.1 (Transition Dependence Logic - Syntax) Let Σ be a first-
order signature. Then the sets of all transition terms and of all formulas of
Dependence Transition Logic are given by the rules
τ ::= ∃v | ∀v | φ? | τ ⊗ τ | τ ∩ τ | τ ; τ
φ ::= R~t | ¬R~t | =(t1, . . . , tn) | φ ∨ φ | φ ∧ φ | 〈τ〉φ.
where v ranges over all variables in Var, R ranges over all relation symbols of
the signature, ~t ranges over all tuples of terms of the required arities, n ranges
over N and t1 . . . tn range over the terms of our signature.
Definition 3.2 (Transition Dependence Logic - Semantics) Let M be a
first-order model, let τ be a first-order transition term of the same signature,
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x y
s a b
s′ a c
. . . . . . . . .
X b 6= c
∀z
x y z
s[b/z] a b b
s[c/z] a b c
s′[b/z] a c b
s′[c/z] a c c
. . . . . . . . .
X [M/z]
∨
X [M/z] = Y ∪ Z
x y z
s[b/z] a b b
s′[c/z] a c c
. . . . . . . . .
z = y
Y
x y z
s[c/z] a b c
s′[b/z] a c b
. . . . . . . . .
z 6= y ∧ xz | xy
Z
Figure 1: Checking =(x, y) by evaluating ∀z(z = y∨ (z 6= y∧xz | xy)). If b 6= c,
then Z does not satisfy the xz | xy.
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and let X and Y be teams over M . Then we say that the transition X → Y is
allowed by τ in M , and we write M |=X→Y τ , if and only if
TDL-∃: τ is of the form ∃v for some v ∈ Var and there exists a F such that
X [F/v] ⊆ Y ;
TDL-∀: τ is of the form ∀v for some v ∈ Var and X [M/v] ⊆ Y ;
TDL-test: τ is of the form φ?, M |=X φ in the sense given later in this
definition, and X ⊆ Y ;
TDL-⊗: τ is of the form τ1⊗ τ2 and X = X1 ∪X2 for some X1 and X2 such
that M |=X1→Y τ1 and M |=X2→Y τ2;
TDL-∩: τ is of the form τ1 ∩ τ2, M |=X→Y τ1 and M |=X→Y τ2;
TDL-concat: τ is of the form τ1; τ2 and there exists a team Z such that
M |=X→Z τ1 and M |=Z→Y τ2.
Similarly, if φ is a formula and X is a team with domain Var. Then we say
that X satisfies φ in M , and we write M |=X φ, if and only if
TDL-lit: φ is a first-order literal and M |=s φ in the usual first-order sense
for all s ∈ X;
TDL-dep: φ is a dependence atom =(t1, . . . , tn) and any two s, s
′ ∈ X which
assign the same values to t1 . . . tn−1 also assign the same value to tn;
TDL-∨: φ is of the form φ1 ∨ φ2 and M |=X φ1 or M |=X φ2;
TDL-∧: φ is of the form φ1 ∧ φ2, M |=X φ1 and M |=X φ2;
TDL-⋄: φ is of the form 〈τ〉ψ and there exists a Y such that M |=X→Y τ and
M |=Y ψ.
As the next theorem shows, in this semantics formulas and transitions are in-
terpreted in terms of trumps and transition systems:
Theorem 3.3 For all Transition Dependence Logic formulas φ, all models M
and all teams X and Y , we have that
Downwards Closure: If M |=X φ and Y ⊆ X then M |=Y φ;
Empty Team Property: M |=∅ φ.
Furthermore, for all Transition Dependence Logic transition terms τ , all models
M and all teams X, Y and Z,
Downwards Closure: If M |=X→Y τ and Z ⊆ X then M |=Z→Y τ ;
Monotonicity: If M |=X→Y τ and Y ⊆ Z then M |=X→Z τ ;
Non-creation: For all Y , M |=∅→Y τ ;
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Non-triviality: If X 6= ∅ then M 6|=X→∅ τ .
Proof:
The proof is by structural induction over φ and τ , and presents no difficulties
whatsoever.

Also, it is not difficult to see, on the basis of the results of the previous
section, that this new variant of Dependence Logic is equivalent to the usual
one:
Theorem 3.4 For every Dependence Logic formula φ there exists a Transition
Dependence Logic transition term τφ such that
M |=X φ⇔ ∃Y s.t. M |=X→Y τφ ⇔M |=X 〈τφ〉⊤
for all first-order models M and teams X.
Proof:
τφ is defined by structural induction on φ, as follows:
1. If φ is a first-order literal or a dependence atom then τφ = φ?;
2. If φ is φ1 ∨ φ2 then τφ = τφ1 ⊗ τφ2 ;
3. If φ is φ1 ∧ φ2 then τφ = τφ1 ∩ τφ2 ;
4. If φ is ∃vψ then τφ = ∃v; τψ ;
5. If φ is ∀vψ then τφ = ∀v; τψ .
It is then trivial to verify, again by induction on φ, that M |=X φ if and only if
M |=X 〈τφ〉⊤, as required.

This representation result associates Dependence Logic formulas to Transition
Dependence Logic transition terms. This fact highlights the dynamical nature of
Dependence Logic operators, which we discussed in the previous subsection: in
this framework, quantifiers describe transformations of teams, the Dependence
Logic connectives are operations over games, and the literals are interpreted as
tests. In fact, one might wonder what is the purpose of Transition Dependence
Logic formulas: could we do away with them altogether, and develop a variant
of Transition Dependence Logic in which all formulas are transitions?
Later, we will explore this idea further; but first, let us verify that Transition
Dependence Logic is no more expressive than Dependence Logic.
Theorem 3.5 For every Transition Dependence Logic formula φ there exists a
Dependence Logic formula T (φ) such that
M |=X φ⇔M |=X T (φ)
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for all first-order models M and teams X. Furthermore, for every Transition
Dependence Logic transition term τ and Dependence Logic formula θ there is a
Dependence Logic formula U(τ, ψ) such that
M |=X U(τ, θ)⇔ ∃Y s.t. M |=X→Y τ and M |=Y θ,
again for all first-order models M and teams X.
Proof:
We prove the two claims together, by structural induction over φ and τ .
First, let us consider the cases corresponding to formulas:
1. If φ is a first order literal or a dependence atom, let T (φ) be φ itself. As
the interpretation of these expressions is the same in Dependence Logic
and in Transition Dependence Logic, there is nothing to prove.
2. If φ is of the form ψ1 ∨ ψ2, let T (φ) be T (ψ1) ⊔ T (ψ2). This expression
holds in a team if and only if T (ψ1) or T (ψ2) hold, that is, by induction
hypothesis, if and only if ψ1 or ψ2 do.
3. If φ is of the form ψ1 ∧ ψ2, let T (φ) be T (ψ1) ∧ T (ψ2). Then T (φ) holds
if and only if ψ1 and ψ2 do, that is, if and only if φ does.
4. If φ is of the form 〈τ〉ψ, let ~v be the tuple of all variables occurring in T (ψ),
let R be a new |~v|-ary relation, and let T (φ) be ∃R(U(τ, R~v) ∧ ∀~v(¬R~v ∨
T (ψ))). Indeed, suppose that M |=X T (φ): then for some relation R,
there exists a Y such thatM |=X→Y τ andM |=Y R~v. Furthermore,M |=
∀~v(¬R~v∨T (ψ)), and therefore for the set Y ′ = {s : Dom(s) = ~v,M |=s R~v}
we have that M |=Y ′ T (ψ). But then, by downwards closure and locality,
M |=Y T (ψ), and therefore M |=X 〈τ〉ψ.
Conversely, suppose that M |=X 〈τ〉ψ: then there exists a Y such that
M |=X→Y τ and M |=Y ψ. Now let R be {s(~v) : s ∈ Y }: clearly
M |=X U(τ, R~v), sinceM |=Y R~v, and furthermoreM |= ∀~v(¬R~v∨T (ψ)),
by locality and by the fact that (by induction hypothesis) M |=Y T (ψ).
Now let us consider the cases corresponding to transitions:
5. If τ is of the form ∃v for some variable v, let U(τ, θ) be ∃vθ. Indeed,
suppose that M |=X ∃vθ: then M |=X[F/v] θ for some F , and by choosing
Y = X [F/v] we have that M |=X→Y ∃v and M |=Y θ, as required.
Conversely, suppose that for some Y , M |=X→Y ∃v andM |=Y θ: then for
some F , X [F/v] ⊆ Y , and by downwards closure we have that M |=X[F/v]
θ.
6. If τ is of the form ∀v for some variable v, let U(τ, θ) be ∀vθ. Indeed,
suppose that M |=X ∀vθ: then M |=X[M/v] θ, and if we choose Y =
X [M/v] we have at once that M |=X→Y ∀v and M |=Y θ. Conversely,
if for some Y M |=X→Y ∀v and M |=Y θ then X [M/v] ⊆ Y and, by
downwards closure, M |=X[M/v] θ.
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7. If τ is of the form φ?, let U(τ, θ) be T (φ)∧θ. Indeed, suppose thatM |=X
T (φ) ∧ θ: then by induction hypothesis M |=X φ, and, for Y = X , we
have that M |=X→Y φ?. Furthermore, M |=Y θ, as required. Conversely,
suppose that for some Y ,M |=X→Y φ? andM |=Y θ. ThenM |=X φ, and
therefore M |=X T (φ); and furthermore X ⊆ Y , and hence by downwards
closure M |=X θ. Hence, M |=X T (φ) ∧ θ.
8. If τ is of the form τ1 ⊗ τ2 and ~v is the tuple of all free variables of θ then
let U(τ, θ) be ∃R((U(τ1, R~v) ∨ U(τ2, R~v)) ∧ ∀~v(¬R~v ∨ θ)), where R is a
new |~r|-ary relation symbol. Indeed, suppose that M |=X U(τ, θ): then
there exists a relation R and two subteams X1 and X2 of X such that
X = X1 ∪X2, M |=X1 U(τ1, R~v) and M |=X2 U(τ2, R~v). Hence, there are
two teams Y1 and Y2 such that M |=X1→Y1 τ1, M |=X2→Y2 τ2, M |=Y1 R~v
and M |=Y2 R~v. Now, let Y be Y1 ∪ Y2: by monotonicity, we have that
M |=X1→Y τ1 and M |=X2→Y τ2, and furthermore M |=Y R~v too (that
is, for all s ∈ Y , s(~v) is in R). Since M |= ∀~v(¬R~v ∨ θ), this implies that
M |=Y θ, by locality and downwards closure.
Conversely, suppose that there is a Y such that M |=X→Y τ1 ⊗ τ2 and
M |=Y θ. Then let R be {s(~v) : s ∈ Y }. Now X = X1 ∪ X2 for two
X1 and X2 such that M |=X1→Y τ1 and M |=X2→Y τ2, and by induction
hypothesis we have that M |=X1 U(τ1;R~v) and M |=X2 U(τ2;R~v). But
then M |=X U(τ1;R~v) ∨ U(τ2;R~v); and furthermore, by locality we have
that M |= ∀~v(¬R~v ∨ θ). Hence, M |=X U(τ1 ⊗ τ2, θ), as required.
9. If τ is of the form τ1 ∩ τ2 and ~v is the tuple of all variables of θ then let
U(τ, θ) be ∃~R(U(τ1, R~v)∧U(τ2, R~v)∧∀~v(¬R~v∨ θ)). Indeed, suppose that
M |=X U(τ, θ): then for some relation R, by induction hypothesis, there
exist teams Y1 and Y2 such that M |=X→Y1 τ1, M |=X→Y2 τ2, M |=Y1 R~v
and M |=Y2 R~v. Now let Y be Y1 ∪ Y2: as before, by monotonicity we
have that M |=X→Y τ1 and M |=X→Y τ2, and hence M |=X→Y τ1 ∩ τ2.
Finally, since M |= ∀~v(¬R~v ∨ θ) we have that M |=Y θ, as required.
Conversely, suppose that there is a Y such that M |=X→Y τ1 ∩ τ2 and
M |=Y θ. Since M |=X→Y τ1 ∩ τ2, M |=X→Y τ1 and M |=X→Y τ2.
Now let R be {s(~v) : s ∈ Y }. By induction hypothesis, M |=X U(τ1, R~t)
and M |=X U(τ2, R~t); and furthermore, since M |=Y θ we have that
M |= ∀~v(¬R~v ∨ θ).
10. If τ is of the form τ1; τ2 let U(τ, θ) be U(τ1, U(τ2, θ)). Indeed, M |=X
U(τ1, U(τ2, θ)) if and only if there is a Y such that M |=X→Y and M |=Y
U(τ2, θ), that is, if and only if there are a Y and a Z such that M |=X→Y
τ1, M |=Y→Z τ2 and M |=Z θ.

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However, in a sense, Transition Dependence Logic allows one to consider sub-
tler distinctions than Dependence Logic does. The formula ∀x∃y(=(y, f(x)) ∧
Pxy), for example, could be translated as any of
• 〈∀x; ∃y〉(=(y, f(x)) ∧ Pxy);
• 〈∀x; ∃y〉〈=(y, f(x))?〉Pxy;
• 〈∀x; ∃y〉〈Pxy?〉 =(y, f(x));
• 〈∀x; ∃y〉〈(Pxy?) ∩ (=(y, f(x))?)〉⊤.
The intended interpretations of these formulas are rather different, even though
they happen to be satisfied by the same teams: and for this reason, Transition
Dependence Logic may be thought of as a proper refinement of Dependence
Logic even though it has exactly the same expressive power.
3.3 Dynamic Predicate Logic
Dynamic Semantics is the name given to a family of semantical frameworks
which subscribe to the following principle ([6]):
The meaning of a sentence does not lie in its truth conditions, but
rather in the way it changes (the representation of) the information
of the interpreter.
In various forms, this intuition can be found prefigured in some of the later work
of Ludwig Wittgenstein, as well as in the research of philosophers of language
such as Austin, Grice, Searle, Strawson and others ([1]); but its formal devel-
opment can be traced back to the work of Groenendijk and Stokhof about the
proper treatment of pronouns in formal linguistics ([6]).
We refer to [1] for a comprehensive analysis of the linguistic issues which
caused such a development, as well as for a description of the ways in which this
framework was adapted in order to model presuppositions, questions/answers
and other phenomena; here we will only present a formulation of dynamic pred-
icate semantics, the alternative semantics for first-order logic which was devel-
oped in the above mentioned paper by Groenendijk and Stokhof.
Definition 3.6 (Dynamic Semantics for First-Order Logic) Let φ be a first-
order formula, let M be a suitable first-order model and let s and s′ be two as-
signments. Then we say that the transition from s to s′ is allowed by φ in M ,
and we write M |=s→s′ φ, if and only if
DPL-atom: φ is an atomic formula, s = s′ and M |=s φ in the usual sense;
DPL-¬: φ is of the form ¬ψ, s = s′ and for all assignments h, M 6|=s→h ψ;
DPL-∧: φ is of the form ψ1 ∧ψ2 and there exists an h such that M |=s→h ψ1
and M |=h→s′ ψ2;
26
DPL-∨: φ is of the form ψ1 ∨ ψ2, s = s′ and there exists an h such that
M |=s→h ψ1 or M |=s→h ψ2;
DPL-→: φ is of the form ψ1 → ψ2, s = s′ and for all h it holds that
M |=s→h ψ1 ⇒ ∃h
′ s.t. M |=h→h′ ψ2;
DPL-∃: φ is of the form ∃xψ and there exists an element m ∈ Dom(M) such
that M |=s[m/x]→s′ ψ;
DPL-∀: φ is of the form ∀xψ, s = s′ and for all elements m ∈ Dom(M) there
exists an h such that M |=s[m/x]→h ψ.
A formula φ is satisfied by an assignment s if and only if there exists an as-
signment s′ such that M |=s→s′ φ; in this case, we will write M |=s φ.
We will discuss neither the formal properties of this formalism nor its linguistic
applications here. All that is relevant for our purposes is that, according to it,
formulas are interpreted as transitions from assignments to assignments, and
furthermore that the rule for conjunction allows us to bind occurrences of a
variable of the second conjunct to quantifiers occurring in the first one.9
The similarity between this semantics and our semantics for transition terms
should be evident. Hence, it seems natural to ask whether we can adopt, for a
suitable variant of Dependence Logic, the following variant of Groenendijk and
Stokhof’s motto:
The meaning of a formula does not lie in its satisfaction conditions,
but rather in the team transitions it allows.
From this point of view, transition terms are the fundamental objects of our
syntax, and formulas can be removed altogether from the language – although,
of course, the tests corresponding to literals and dependence formulas should
still be available. As in Groenendijk and Stokhof’s logic, satisfaction becomes
then a derived concept: in brief, a team X can be said to satisfy a term τ if
and only if there exists a Y such that τ allows the transition from X to Y , or,
in other words, if and only if some set of non-losing outcomes can be reached
from the set X of initial positions in the game corresponding to τ .
In the next section, we will make use of these intuitions to develop another,
terser version of Dependence Logic; and finally, we will discuss some implications
of this new version for the further developments and for the possible applications
of this interesting logical formalism.
9For example, consider the formula (∃xPx) ∧Qx: by the rules given, it is easy to see that
M |=s (∃xPx) ∧Qx if and only if PM ∩QM 6= ∅, that is, if and only if M |=s ∃x(Px ∧Qx),
differently from the case of Tarski’s semantics.
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3.4 Dynamic Dependence Logic
We will now develop a formula-free variant of Transition Dependence Logic,
along the lines of Groenendijk and Stockhof’s Dynamic Predicate Logic.
Definition 3.7 (Dynamic Dependence Logic - Syntax) Let Σ be a first-
order signature. The set of all formulas of Dynamic Dependence Logic over Σ
is given by the rules
τ ::= R~t | ¬R~t | =(t1, . . . , tn) | ∃v | ∀v | τ ⊗ τ | τ ∩ τ | τ ; τ
where, as usual, R ranges over all relation symbols of our signature, ~t ranges
over all tuples of terms of the required lengths, n ranges over N, t1 . . . tn range
over all terms, and v ranges over Var.
The semantical rules associated to this language are precisely as one would
expect:
Definition 3.8 (Dynamic Dependence Logic - Semantics) LetM be a first-
order model, let τ be a Dynamic Dependence Logic formula over the signature
of M , and let X and Y be two teams over M with domain Var. Then we say
that τ allows the transition X → Y in M , and we write M |=X→Y τ , if and
only if
DDL-lit: τ is a first-order literal, M |=s τ in the usual first-order sense for
all s ∈ X, and X ⊆ Y ;
DDL-dep: τ is a dependence atom =(t1, . . . , tn), X ⊆ Y , and any two as-
signments s, s′ ∈ X which coincide over t1 . . . tn−1 also coincide over tn;
DDL-∃: τ is of the form ∃v for some v ∈ Var, and X [F/v] ⊆ Y for some
F : X → Dom(M);
DDL-∀: τ is of the form ∀v for some v ∈ Var, and X [M/v] ⊆ Y ;
DDL-⊗: τ is of the form τ1 ⊗ τ2 and X = X1 ∪X2 for two teams X1 and X2
such that M |=X1→Y τ1 and M |=X2→Y τ2;
DDL-∩: τ is of the form τ1 ∩ τ2, M |=X→Y τ1 and M |=X→Y τ2;
DDL-concat: τ is of the form τ1; τ2, and there exists a Z such that M |=X→Z
τ1 and M |=Z→Y τ2.
A formula τ is said to be satisfied by a team X in a model M if and only if
there exists a Y such that M |=X→Y τ ; and if this is the case, we will write
M |=X τ .
It is not difficult to see that Dynamic Dependence Logic is equivalent to
Transition Dependence Logic (and, therefore, to Dependence Logic).
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Proposition 3.1 Let φ be a Dependence Logic formula. Then there exists a
Dynamic Dependence Logic formula φ′ which is equivalent to it, in the sense
that
M |=X φ⇔M |=X φ
′ ⇔ ∃Y s.t. M |=X→Y φ
′
for all suitable teams X and models M
Proof:
We build φ′ by structural induction:
1. If φ is a literal or a dependence atom then φ′ = φ;
2. If φ is ψ1 ∨ ψ2 then φ′ = ψ′1 ⊗ ψ
′
2;
3. If φ is ψ1 ∧ ψ2 then φ′ = ψ′1 ∩ ψ
′
2;
4. If φ is ∃xψ then φ′ = ∃x;ψ′;
5. If φ is ∀xψ then φ′ = ∀x;ψ′.

Proposition 3.2 Let τ be a Dynamic Dependence Logic formula. Then there
exists a Transition Dependence Logic transition term τ ′ such that
M |=X→Y τ ⇔M |=X→Y τ
′
for all suitable X, Y and M , and such that hence
M |=X τ ⇔M |=X 〈τ
′〉⊤.
Proof:
Build τ ′ by structural induction:
1. If τ is a literal or dependence atom then τ ′ = τ?;
2. If τ is of the form ∃v or ∀v then τ ′ = τ ;
3. If τ is of the form τ1 ⊗ τ2 then τ ′ = τ ′1 ⊗ τ
′
2;
4. If τ is of the form τ1 ∩ τ2 then τ ′ = τ ′1 ∩ τ
′
2;
5. If τ is of the form τ1; τ2 then τ
′ = τ ′1; τ
′
2.

Corollary 3.9 Dynamic Dependence Logic is equivalent to Transition Depen-
dence Logic and to Dependence Logic
Proof:
Follows from the two previous results and from the equivalence between Depen-
dence Logic and Transition Dependence Logic.

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4 Further Work
In this work, we established a connection between a variant of Dynamic Game
Logic and Dependence Logic, and we used it as the basis for the development of
variants of Dependence Logic in which it is possible to talk directly about tran-
sitions from teams to teams. This suggests a new perspective on Dependence
Logic and Team Semantics, one which allow us to study them as a special kind
of algebras of nondeterministic transitions between relations. One of the main
problems that is now open is whether it is possible to axiomatize these algebras,
in the same sense in which, in [14], Allen Mann offers an axiomatization of the
algebra of trumps corresponding to IF Logic (or, equivalently, to Dependence
Logic).
Furthermore, we might want to consider different choices of connectives,
like for example ones related to the theory of database transactions. The in-
vestigation of the relationships between the resulting formalisms is a natural
continuation of the currently ongoing work on the study of the relationship be-
tween various extensions of Dependence Logic, and promises of being of great
utility for the further development of this fascinating line of research.
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